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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Brooke Coleman's article, Civil-izing Federalism,' is an
important and thoughtful contribution to what is sure to be a
burgeoning literature on the United States Supreme Court in the ten
years that John Roberts has served as the Chief Justice. More
importantly, Coleman's article is a wide-ranging and ambitious attempt
to provide both a description and interpretation of the Roberts Court's
willingness to override its ordinary solicitude for state governments
where state litigation is concerned. Coleman highlights the extent to
which the "conservative" and "liberal" wings of the Supreme Court
have "switched" roles when it comes to the Court's protection of state
litigation, with conservatives in favor of greater incursions on state
authority and liberals in favor of protecting state litigation against
federal incursions.2 Ranging across areas of litigation as broad as
personal jurisdiction, preemption, arbitration, and Eie conflicts,
Coleman identifies three themes in the Roberts Court's "civil
procedure" jurisprudence that explain its differential treatment of states
where access to litigation is concerned: (1) conservative distrust of
state courts, state juries, and state law; (2) conservative distrust of
certain substantive claims, such as discrimination and products liability
* © 2014 Charlton C. Copeland. Professor of Law, University of Miami Law
School.
1. Brooke D. Coleman, CiviL-izing Fedemlism, 89 TUL. L. REv. 307 (2014).
2. Coleman is not the first to challenge the Supreme Court conservatives' lack of
fidelity to the principles of federalism in some doctrinal areas. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehmquist Courts Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHi. L.




claims; and (3) conservative distrust of litigation, particularly class
action litigation, as a form of dispute resolution.
This response will not waste limited space providing a further
overview of Coleman's argument. Nor will I quibble with Coleman's
reading of particular cases, because I think that she makes a
compelling case for her primary assertions. This does not mean that
there is nothing to quibble with in Coleman's article, but I would rather
expand those things toward which the article gestures. If there is a
criticism with Coleman's undertaking, it is not so much in what she
says, but in what is left unsaid. Coleman's project is, I suspect, bigger
than even her ambitious article suggests. That is, she has a normative
agenda. Yet the contours and justifications for the agenda remain in
the background. My response will attempt to foreground the
normative aspirations behind her article and highlight issues that will
require Coleman's attention as she moves forward in this endeavor.
Needless to say, I think it is a worthy one, and she a worthy advocate.
In broad outline, what follows is my challenge to Coleman's
invitation to incredulity as to the Roberts Court's inconsistency in
relation to state litigation and other dimensions of its state-regarding
jurisprudence. Specifically, I question whether it ought to be regarded
as disrespect for state institutions where federal incursions on state
authority are premised on a determination that state institutions-here,
state courts-are unworthy of trust and deference. Rather than being
concerned about federalism as such, Coleman appears to be worried
about something far more substantive, and it is the gesture toward the
substantive that takes up the remainder of this Response. Here, I argue
that Coleman is committed to the vindication of individual claims of
injury through litigation, either in single or combined form, as a
mechanism for risk regulation. I argue that once this normative value
is faced squarely, we can move on to the important project of
challenging the value that underwrites the Court's distrust of state
institutions anc more importantly, defend litigation as disruptive of
monopolization of the market for risk regulation and rights
vindication.3
3. A recent discussion of federalism makes an important case for thinking about the
substantive dimension of federalism in the present political age of "ideologically coherent"
and "polarized" political parties. Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues, "Democratic and
Republican, not state and national, are today's political identities." Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Partisan Fedemlism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014). As such, substantive battles-like
the appropriate amount of deterrence for corporate activity-are fought within the federalism
framework.
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II. THINKING ABOUT FEDERALISM AS A MERE MEANS
One of the most important themes in Coleman's article is the
centrality of conservative distrust in state institutions in incursions on
state litigation. It is clear that Coleman thinks that this assessment is
not entirely correct as an empirical matter. What is less clear is
whether she thinks it is problematic as an analytical exercise. As stated
above, Coleman draws our attention to the Roberts Court's repeated
assertions of the failures of state adjudicative institutions, but it is not
altogether clear what she wants us to draw from the scene. Perhaps
unfairly, I will assume that Coleman wants us to be bothered by the
fact of the Court's distrust, but distrust of state capacity and
willingness are at the heart of our most important constitutional grants
of authority to the national government. The Framers of our
Constitution based the grant to federal courts of adjudicative authority
over suits involving citizens of different states on concerns about actual
or perceived self-dealing on the part of state courts in relation to the
claims and defenses of out-of-state litigants.4 In an effort to preserve
good relations among the several states, the federal courts were
empowered to entertain these disputes in an era when allegiance to
one's state exceeded allegiance to the larger collective.! Beyond the
adjudicative context, scholars have pointed to Article I's grant of
substantive regulatory authority to the national legislature as based, in
part, on the assumption of state incapacity to resolve certain kinds of
collective action problems.6 As such, distrust of state institutions and
subsequent incursions on their authority are not new or strange in our
constitutional-political history.
Within federal courts law, federal decisions to enjoin state court
proceedings were premised on a determination of the trustworthiness
of state institutions and state law to provide effective vindication of
federal rights claims.7 Finally, the Court's jurisprudence of the
adequacy of state decisions on state law grounds has been premised on
determinations of the trustworthiness of the state institutions, which
might have had reason to shield their decisions from Supreme Court
review.8 Coleman's reasonable limitation of the sphere of her analysis
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
7. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Exparte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
8. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Williams v.
Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
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to private litigation would not likely disclose the extent to which
incursions by federal courts into state adjudicative process are
regularly based upon the assessment of state institutions.
The fact that trustworthiness is a common theme in federal-state
relations is not inconsistent with Coleman's larger point: the Roberts
Court has a substantive vision when it deems state adjudicative
institutions to be untrustworthy. Again, this in itself should not be
surprising. Federalism is clearly only as good as the values it makes
possible. When speaking positively of the functions of federalism, we
speak of the extent to which the federal structure of government makes
policy experimentation possible at lower system costs. Examples
include reforms in public assistance a generation ago or how
federalism allows for differentiation in deeply contested areas-
marriage equality might have been understood to fall within this
category until recently. We usually do not add to that list the extent to
which federalism provided a structure of protection for racial
supremacy throughout much of U.S. history.9 What is a bit shadowy in
Coleman's account is whether the Court has picked the correct
substantive value by which to assess the trustworthiness of state
institutions.
Even if one thinks that the Roberts Court is analytically correct in
basing its decisions to interfere with state judicial institutions on its
determination of their trustworthiness, the Court can be rightly
criticized for its attempts to protect interests that remain in political
contestation-namely the thwarting of individual tort litigation as an
avenue of risk regulation and effective redress of injury. For example,
when federal courts interfere with state judicial process in the name of
fair criminal process or even racial egalitarian substantive policies,
these have been understood to be within the realm of authorized bases
of interference, even where they have engendered controversy.
Drawing upon Coleman's insightful analysis, it becomes apparent that
the Roberts Court's interference with state adjudication is based upon a
substantive commitment to the deregulation of U.S. business, which is
thought to suffer under the weight of overzealous litigation. Coleman
suggests that it is problematic that the courts might "use procedure"
9. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REv. 4 (2010) (discussing the "strained" relationship between federalism and equal
protection); Michael W McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. Cuu.
L. REv. 1484 (1987) (book review) (writing favorably about federalism as a structure, yet
directly addressing federalism's complicity with the tyranny of the local majority over the
rights of minorities at the state level in American history).
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for substantive ends, " namely to curtail access to employment
discrimination and product liability claims, to name two. However, it
is not altogether clear that this is not the sort of use to which
procedural rules ought to be put. If we accept that federalism
(understood as state-decisional autonomy) is a value that might be
overcome under certain conditions and for certain ends, then it seems
that it would be correct to override federalism upon a certain showing
(failure of the state institutions) to protect certain other overriding
values (equality and fair process). The central question that Coleman's
project raises is whether the values that the Court attempts to protect
are the appropriate values."
My comments should be understood as challenging the extent to
which Coleman posits a conception of federalism that can be divorced
from its ends. If we accept the proposition that assessments of the
trustworthiness of state institutions are present in our constitutional
culture and have become a regular part of our Constitution's life across
time in several jurisprudential spheres, then we should not be troubled
by what the Roberts Court says about state courts, at least as an
analytical matter. Moreover, if we concede that trustworthiness
assessments are not foreign to "our federalism," then it is reasonable to
ask whether the assessments are driven by attempts to protect
substantive interests. This, too, has often been the case. So what, then,
do we make of Coleman's federalism problem? I contend that
Coleman's federalism problem is not really a federalism problem, at
least not in the procedural, nonsubstantive sense. Rather, it is about
something more. And it is to that which I now turn.
III. THINKING ABOUT MEANS AND ENDS
Though Coleman might be read to argue that federalism concerns
should play no role in procedural cases, she clearly believes that state
litigation plays an important regulatory role that should be
10. Coleman, supra note 1, at 334.
11. If one thinks about statutory enactments as evidence of public value
commitments, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC
OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010), one might argue that the passage
of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) at the dawn of the Roberts Court suggests
that there is a national consensus that distrusts the capacity of state judicial institutions
(particularly in the class action context) in disputes that involve significant risk to corporate
defendants. I do not argue that CAFA is path-breaking legislation in a league with the
National Labor Relations Act or the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it might be understood by




accommodated. Relying on normative accounts of federalism's
function, Coleman argues that the traditional accounts of federalism
apply in large part to the private litigation context. Taken together,
these suggest that the state's interest in protecting its citizens ought to
be taken into account in procedural cases having some federalism
impact. Coleman writes that taking seriously states' interest in civil
adjudication means that the Court "should give their interests" due
consideration. 2 However, it is unclear how Coleman proposes to guide
the Court's analysis of whether and when state law should yield in the
face of a conflict with a national adjudicative or regulatory regime.
Coleman's declaration that federalism ought to count in the Court's
analytical frameworks regarding procedure does not provide a clear
picture of why state interest ought to count, or the way such counting
might affect the outcome of the cases that she describes for us. This is
evidenced when Coleman suggests that federalism is of value to the
extent that it ensures the division of political power and the protection
of liberty. It is not until nearly the end of the article that Coleman
asserts that the Court's deference to state adjudicative processes
generally furthers the ambition of ensuring access to justice. In this
account, federalism and private litigation are potential accomplices
because each has the potential to disrupt the monopolization of both
the methods (litigation or regulation) and means (national agencies and
courts or state courts) by which policy around risk regulation and
rights vindication is set. It is here that Coleman appears to posit the
most explicit normative case for access to litigation as a tool for
reforming the behavior of corporate actors.
Although its presentation is somewhat muted, Coleman clearly
believes that protecting private litigants' ability to bring claims for
rights violations serves the function of protecting liberty.3 Coleman
writes against much scholarship that appears not to value litigation as
contributing to the adversarial culture of the United States.' 4 Like
other scholars who laud litigation's capacity to deliver knowledge of
injury to the public and to hold actors accountable for the harms they
cause, Coleman, although in a bit of a whisper, celebrates litigation's
capacity to affect behavior broadly.
12. Coleman, supra note 1, at 360.
13. Coleman is clearly not alone in this regard. See, e.g., CARL T BOGUS, WHY
LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE
COMMON LAW (2001).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW (2001).
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Thus, Coleman's call for a jurisprudence that takes state interests
into account does not arise out of an abstract commitment to state
dignity or sovereignty, but rather is grounded in the substantive
assertion that state adjudicative institutions increase the likelihood that
individual citizens will have the ability to challenge powerful interests
whose decisions and actions cause harm. Understood in this way,
Coleman's federalism is not nearly as "neutral" as she initially
presents. Federalism here is about multiplicity and fractionation, but
multiplicity and fractionation at the service of the substantive end of
litigant access. But litigation does more, and though Coleman gestures
at this "more," the next Part will attempt to draw out the institutional
dimension of litigation.'5
IV. THINKING ABOUT MEANS AND ENDS AND INSTITUTIONS
Lingering in the background of Coleman's article is the verdict
that the liberal Justices render in favor of litigation at the state level-
that bureaucratic institutions are often unable or unwilling to respond
to the rights violations that threaten safety and health. Even less
explicit is the assertion that such agencies need adjudicative justice to
better perform their jobs. This final Part attempts to foreground the
institutional dimension of Coleman's article, which rests, at least in
part, on the assertion that both litigation and federalism offer the
possibility of disrupting institutional monopolization of policy around
risk regulation and the compensation of victims for injuries sustained
by the actions and decisions of market actors. This discussion will
draw on cases in the preemption context that pit litigation against the
calibrated policy choices of the bureaucratic sphere and paint litigation
as disruptive of those institutions and their hard-fought policy
objectives. It will also briefly draw on literature about private
litigation's interaction with, and impact on, other institutions. Lastly, it
will draw on the impact that institutional competition has on litigation.
Despite Coleman's focus on the Roberts Court, my discussion of
the institutional dimension of the preemption jurisprudence focuses on
cases from the Rehnquist Court Era. This discussion addresses the
extent to which the roots of the Rehnquist Court's preemption
jurisprudence lay in the asserted fear of the disruption and intrusion
upon the settlements reached by the national political process by
15. For an important discussion of the institutional dimension of litigation, including
decisions to create rights of private enforcement, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010).
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individually initiated litigation and state regulatory regimes.16 The
cases discussed below embody the Court's fear of disruption of the
national balance that underwrites its preemption jurisprudence beyond
contexts of explicit congressional authorization or conflict.
One of the best examples of the Court's expansive turn in
preemption jurisprudence is Geier v Ameican Honda Motor Co., in
which the Court was willing to preempt state common law claims
where there was neither explicit congressional authorization nor a clear
conflict between state and federal law. '7 The case involved a
determination of whether a state tort action was preempted by the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Motor Vehicle
Safety Act). The plaintiff, Alexis Geier, brought suit against Honda
Motor Company as a result of injuries she sustained because of her car
striking a tree. She alleged that Honda was liable for defective
manufacture of the vehicle because it was equipped only with seat
belts and not with airbags or other passive restraint devices. The Court
held that her action against Honda was preempted despite the presence
of a savings clause in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. It based its
conclusion on its determination that the "no airbag" suit was
incompatible with the achievements of the federal motor vehicle safety
standards.
The Court explicitly held that the Motor Vehicle Safety Act's
savings clause undermined any argument that the statute expressly
preempted the state tort claim brought by Geier. Nevertheless, the
Court declared that it would not "give broad effect to [the] saving
clause[] where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme
established by federal law."'8 The Court concluded that state "no
airbag" suits are in conflict with the federal safety standard.
According to the majority, the 1984 version of Safety Standard 208,
which governed the production of Geier's 1987 Honda, required some
portion of manufactured automobiles to include passive restraints, i.e.,
airbags or automatic seatbelts. The Court described Safety Standard
208 as allowing vehicle manufacturers to decide between installing
16. The conception of disruption that I use throughout this response is based on a
conception that increased institutional players complicate the policy-making process. It also
rests on an assertion that different institutions might allow different groups to access the
levers of policy making in different ways. For a thoughtful articulation of the basis for this,
see SEAN D. EHRLICH, ACCESS POINTS: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF POLICY BIAS AND
POLICY COMPLEXITY 5-24 (2011).
17. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
18. Id at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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airbags or automatic seatbelts. The Court recognized that the
allowance of alternative approaches would provide the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) with data on the comparative
effectiveness of the alternate safety mechanisms, allow the auto
industry time to incorporate airbags safely and cost-effectively into
their automobile design, and allow for the development of cheaper,
alternative passive restraints. The Court, with Justice Stephen Breyer
writing for the majority, emphasized the passive restraint rule's
procedural and substantive history (familiar to all administrative law
students), which involved several factors related to the relationship
between passive restraints and automobile injuries. In short, the Court
emphasized the extent to which the development of Safety Standard
208 involved input from different institutional actors--Congress, the
courts, and the agencies--over a period of almost twenty years.
Further, the Court emphasized the different, and competing, factors
that went into the DOT's promulgation of Safety Standard 208. Each
of these established the Court's conclusion that Safety Standard 208
"embodies the Secretary's policy judgment" about the most
appropriate way to ensure increased auto safety.19 The Court described
the safety standard as the product of learning and policy judgment that
weighed and balanced competing alternatives in an uncertain and
evolving policy environment.
The Court's depiction of state policy as a threat to carefully
calibrated national policy has not been limited to contexts of
individually initiated suits under state tort law. In Crosby v National
Foreign Trade Council, the Court preempted a Massachusetts statute
that prohibited the state from doing business with companies doing
business with Burma." The basis of the Court's preemption holding
was that the state statute posed an obstacle to the fulfillment of
congressional purpose in a federal statute imposing mandatory and
conditional sanctions on Burma. The Court concluded that the
Massachusetts statute undermined three aspects of the federal
sanctions statute in that it infringed on the delegation of discretion to
the President to manage the sanctions imposed on Burma, it expanded
sanctions to include actors not covered in the federal sanctions statute,
and it interfered with the President's development of a
19. Id. at 881 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 25, Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (No. 98-1811)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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"comprehensive, multilateral strategy toward Burma," which would
involve diplomacy with other nations.21
The Court described the federal sanctions regime as having
delegated to the President "flexible and effective authority over
economic sanctions against Burma."22 The flexibility allowed the
President to unilaterally terminate any and all sanctions if he
determined that there was progress in Burma's record on democracy
and human rights protections. The Court held that the authority to
terminate the sanctions imposed in the federal legislation would be
undermined by the Massachusetts statute that imposed economic
sanctions outside of this regime. By contrast, the Court described the
Massachusetts statute as imposing an inflexible sanctions regime
because its sanctions had immediate effect and had no termination
provision. Explaining its conclusion that this posed an obstacle for the
President's authority, the Court wrote:
This unyielding application undermines the President's intended
statutory authority by making it impossible for him to restrain fully the
coercive power of the national economy when he may choose to take
the discretionary action open to him, whether he believes that the
national interest requires sanctions to be lifted, or believes that the
promise of lifting sanctions would move the Burmese regime in the
democratic direction. Quite simply, if the Massachusetts law is
enforceable the President has less to offer and less economic and
diplomatic leverage as a consequence.2 3
The Court described the President's diplomatic exercise of
authority as bargaining with the Burmese regime for improvement in
its record on both democracy and human rights. The President's
bargaining with the Burmese regime is described as requiring the
President to have full recourse to all of the "bargaining chips" that the
American economy represents. Any parallel attempt at the state level
to regulate the domain within the President's portfolio "reduces the
value of the chips created by the federal [sanctions] statute."24 The
federal sanctions regime is further depicted in terms that suggest that
Congress provided the President with a tool kit with which he was to
apply pressure on the Burmese regime in an effort to change its
conduct and ultimately its political system. It represents Congress's
"calibration of [the] force" required in the President's diplomatic
21. Id at 373-74.
22. Id. at 374.
23. Id at 377.
24. Id
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arsenal. To the extent that the Massachusetts statute augments that
force, it undermines the specific calibration that Congress had
reached. Like the regulatory regime depicted in Geier, the federal
sanctions regime in Crosbyrepresented the resting point of Congress's
deliberations about what would be necessary to bring about change in
Burma.
In addition to the state statute's undermining of the President's
arsenal of "chips" in his bargaining with Burma, the Court held that
the state statute interfered with the President's larger diplomatic
functions with other nations in establishing a "comprehensive,
multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights
practices ... in Burma."2 The Court declared that the development of
an international effort with respect to Burma was undermined because
the President's voice is "obscured" by any action outside of the
Executive's. The Court concluded that the Massachusetts statute
"threaten[ed] to complicate discussions [with other nations]" and
impaired the President's ability to "speak for the Nation with one voice
in dealing with other governments."26 In comparison to the calibration
and consideration that underwrite the President's exercise of authority
under the national sanctions regime, the Court declared that "enclaves
fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics" at the state and
local level threated incoherence in the President's international
bargaining posture. Though this case might be read as suigeneris in
that it involves a confrontation with a state directly, foreign affairs
considerations have been important in deciding cases involving solely
private actors. Specifically, federal courts have preempted state law
suits between Holocaust victims and insurance companies for their
actions during the Nazi occupation of Europe on similar grounds.
It is also important to consider again the institutional dimension
of the Roberts Court's distrust of state adjudicative institutions. It is
premised upon the Roberts Court's assertions that state courts are sites
dependent upon ignorant juries to litigate complex disputes, whereas
the regulatory agencies are sympathetically seen as experts in the
specific areas of regulatory policy. Coleman deftly deploys the way in
which state court process is juxtaposed against administrative expertise
and found wanting by the Roberts Court. Moreover, Coleman's
25. Id. at 380 (quoting Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
26. Id at 381.
27. See, e.g., In reAssicurazioni Generali, S.PA., 592 E3d 113,118 (2d Cir. 2010).
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portrayal of the Court's negative attitude toward substantive claims and
procedural forms (that is, class action litigation) describes arguments
that tend to demonstrate the untrustworthiness of state adjudicative
process. Specifically, state litigation is rendered as the domain of
unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorneys, who have captured state adjudi-
cative institutions. Moreover, class actions introduce irrationality into
the litigation process by raising the risk of outsized jury awards, which
disconnects the decision to settle or litigate disputes from the merits of
the underlying claim, thereby encouraging more "frivolous" litigation.
It is this narrative of administrative competence versus litigation's
irrationality that underwrites the Court's case law.
But those arguing against preemption have fought back against
these conclusions, arguing against the relative competencies of
agencies that are in the grips of the industries they regulate.28 For
example, coverage of the General Motors (GM) ignition failure
tragedy has pointed to the laxity of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration in identifying the problem and forcing GM to
respond with appropriate changes.29 In other eras, scholars have
acknowledged the information asymmetry that exists between drug
manufacturers and the Food and Drug Administration about the
negative effects of drugs that have been approved. Others have
pointed out the resource deficits that make it difficult for agency actors
to overcome such information deficiencies even where the political
will is present. But there is also the assertion that agencies and
industry involve a revolving door that includes professionals who have
spent much of their careers defending industry actors against
bureaucratic and adjudicative regulation and who are not being
empowered to "guard the henhouse." These institutional dynamics are
clearly present in Coleman's discussion, but foregrounding them draws
our attention to another issue that is less explicit but perhaps more
important in thinking about how litigation and federalism work
together.
Litigation disrupts the monopolization of risk regulation. It
rejects the belief that industries can, without outside pressure, police
themselves. It also rejects the contention that "experts" are the only
source of regulatory control. Indeed, litigation is no less a pessimist
28. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008).
29. Hilary Stout & Aaron M. Kessler, Senators Take Auto Agency To Task over G.M
Recall, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), http:///www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/business/senate-
hearing-on-nhtsa-and-recalls.html?_r-0.
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about the capacity of these institutions to adequately deter actions that
threaten safety and well-being than is the Roberts Court. Calls for
litigation rest on assertions of institutional incompetence and capture
no less than the Roberts Court. Scholars of adversarial culture have
argued in examination of particular areas that litigation plays an
important role in shaking bureaucratic and professional cultures out of
their comfort with their capacity to regulate risk. Political science
scholar Charles Epp has argued that litigation empowers outside
agitators with a formal mechanism that intrudes upon cloistered
cultures that seek to resolve problems of risk through the
monopolization of access to information and the attention of the
dominant actors. Epp writes:
All administrative systems, whether of the insulated professionalism or
the legal oversight variety, are human systems shaped by patterns of
socially based cognition and communication. All therefore are subject
to substantial variation in their processes and behaviors based on
variations in socially based models of knowledge and norms. All
human systems seek to minimize embarrassment based on shared
public norms. But systems of insulated professionalism have richly
developed mechanisms for protecting members of the organization
from embarrassment in the eyes of the public .... The decentralized,
court-centered system of oversight in the United States, by contrast,
imposes the constant possibility of a fully public airing of individual
complaints through the mechanism of the lawsuit, creating a powerful
incentive for reform.30
Federalism, which offers the possibility of variation in substantive
norm articulation, provides the mechanism by which litigation is able
to serve its intrusive, disruptive, and reforming potential. Understood
in this way, we might shift from the burden of defending abstract
conceptions of federalism to arguing in favor of the ways in which
federalism, at least in some areas, allows for the contestation over the
ways in which a democratic polity will respond to the need to deter
behavior that threatens the safety and well-being of the population.
Coleman has provided us with a useful and important place to begin
this conversation. Indeed, it gestures away from procedure as merely
procedural. One can only hope that Coleman, and those like her,
accept the invitation that she has extended in this worthy contribution.
30. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 228 (2009).
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